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ESSAY 
SPELLING OUT SPOKEO 
CRAIG KONNOTH† & SETH KREIMER‡ 
The modern law of Article III standing in federal courts constitutes an 
enduring conundrum. It rests on “an idea, which is more than an intuition but 
less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential 
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of 
government.”1 Over the years, efforts to capture that idea in doctrine have 
spawned cycles of refinement and reformulation. But as Justice Harlan observed 
in dissent at the beginning of the last cycle of reform, the process often threatens 
to “reduce[] constitutional standing to a word game played by secret rules.”2 
In 1970, the Court unveiled a new touchstone for standing—the 
“injury in fact” requirement.3 Over the next four and a half decades—under 
the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts—“injury in fact” became the 
“bedrock” Article III prerequisite for a party invoking the power of federal 
courts.4 Over one hundred Supreme Court cases turned on the presence or 
absence of “injury in fact,” festooning the bedrock with adjectives: adequate 
† Sharswood Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
‡ Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
The authors acknowledge with gratitude the insightful comments of Professor Catherine 
Struve. Errors are our own. 
1 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)). 
2 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
3 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (“The first question is 
whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”). 
4 See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003) (“One element of the ‘bedrock’ case-or-
controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue. . . . [W]e 
have reiterated . . . that . . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate an ‘injury in fact’ . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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“injury in fact” was to be “personal and tangible,” “concrete and particularized,” 
“actual or imminent,” and/or “distinct and palpable.”5  
Last Term, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, a short-handed Court endeavored to 
bring order to the adjectives.6 The case generated more than three-dozen 
amicus briefs from the defense bar, the business establishment, and the 
technology sector arrayed against those from academics, public interest 
advocates, and consumer protection organizations. In resolving the arguments, 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion distinguished between the requirement of 
“particularized” injury and the requirement of “concrete” injury and 
established the proposition that a plaintiff might demonstrate “injury in fact” 
that is “concrete” but “intangible.”7 The opacity of these categories refreshes 
Justice Harlan’s worry about “word game[s] played by secret rules.”8 
In what follows, we seek to parse the rules of Spokeo so that, even if fuzzy, 
they are a bit less secret. We derive from the cryptic language of Spokeo a six-stage 
process (complete with flowchart) that represents the Court’s current 
equilibrium. We put each step in the context of standing precedent, and 
demonstrate that while Spokeo added structure to the injury in fact doctrine, 
each stage of the analysis adds play in the joints, leaving future courts and 
litigants substantial room for maneuver. 
I. THE WHEEL OF SPOKEO
For decades, Congress has endowed private individuals with statutory 
causes of action that empower them to enforce federal law as “private 
attorneys general.” Many of these statutes provide statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees for successful litigants.9 And for decades, skeptics—the late 
Justice Antonin Scalia prominent among them—have viewed these efforts 
with distaste. One important field of battle concerns whether Congress may 
5 For a discussion of thirty-five years of “injury in fact” and an account of the array of intangible 
informational injuries that have been held to meet the requirement, see Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky 
Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 746-
52 (2016). Other commentators have regularly denounced the requirement as moribund, incoherent, 
and on the verge of dissolution. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational 
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639-41 (1999). See generally David P. Currie, 
Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41; William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 
YALE L.J. 221 (1988). Nonetheless, legions of Supreme Court cases—and lower court cases following 
them—continue to turn on the presence or absence of “injury in fact.” 
6 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
7 Id. at 1548-50. 
8 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
9 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010) (describing the emergent system of private enforcement of 
federal law); Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 684-
712 (2013) (explicating statutory regimes that rely on private enforcement mechanisms). 
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grant standing to individuals who have not, themselves, suffered “injury” in 
the form of physical or economic harm from the malfeasance at issue. 
In 1992, the Court, per the late Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, invalidated the citizen standing provision of the Endangered Species 
Act, holding that Congress could not open courthouse doors to plaintiffs who 
lacked “injury in fact” by granting them legal claims to enforce environmental 
statutes.10 Since Lujan, defendants have regularly sought to invoke the Article 
III “injury in fact” requirement as a shield against plaintiffs lacking tangible 
physical harm or monetizeable damages—especially plaintiffs seeking large, 
aggregate statutory awards on behalf of a class.11 
Spokeo was the latest in the series—this time examining the statutory 
damages provided by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Thomas Robins 
sued Spokeo, Inc., a website offering a “people search engine,” alleging that 
Spokeo had disseminated inaccurate information about him.12 Spokeo reported 
that Robins was married with children, in his fifties, relatively affluent, and 
had a job and graduate degree.13 But according to Robins, all of this 
information was false.14 Robins further alleged—in a conclusory paragraph—that 
dissemination of this information had damaged his employment prospects.15 
Robins brought suit, on behalf of a class, under the FCRA,16 which 
provides statutory damages of “not less than $100 and not more than $1,000” 
for each willful violation “with respect to any consumer.”17 The FCRA 
requires reporting agencies to “follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy of . . . information.”18 Robins alleged that Spokeo 
had violated this and other procedural requirements of the Act.19 
The trial court dismissed on the ground that any “alleged harm to 
Plaintiff ’s employment prospects is speculative, attenuated and implausible;” 
since the alleged inaccuracies actually upgraded Robins’ credentials, Robins 
had not alleged the “injury in fact” necessary to establish Article III 
standing.20 The Ninth Circuit reversed.21 It acknowledged that allegations of 
10 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992). 
11 The last major confrontation before the Court on this issue ended inconclusively, despite 
armadas of amici arrayed on each side. See First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536-37 (2012) 
(dismissing the certiorari petition as improvidently granted). 
12 136 S. Ct. at 1544, 1546. 
13 Id. at 1546. 
14 Id. 
15 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 2014). 
16 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546. 
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)–(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
18 Id. § 1681e(b). 
19 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545-46. 
20 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., No. 10-05306, 2011 WL 11562151, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011). 
21 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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financial injury “were sparse,” but concluded that Robins had demonstrated 
“violations of statutory rights created by the FCRA [that] are ‘concrete, de 
facto injuries’” nonetheless.22 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the defendants and their 
armada of amici could have expected a staunch ally in Justice Scalia. But by 
the time the case was decided, Justice Scalia had departed, and Justice Alito 
wrote for five of eight sitting justices in reversing the Ninth Circuit.23 Justice 
Alito’s opinion did not dismiss the case, as defendant and its amici had urged. 
The opinion instead remanded to the case to the Ninth Circuit and explicitly 
noted it took “no position” as to whether Robins had alleged a “degree of risk” 
of harm “sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”24 On one view, the 
result could be lauded as “judicial minimalism.” On another, to borrow 
posthumously from Justice Scalia, it “seems perversely designed to prolong 
the controversy and the litigation.”25 
II. THE STEPS OF SPOKEO
The Spokeo Court’s brief explanation of the current metes and bounds of 
prerequisite Article III injury identifies no less than six stages on the way to 
assessing “injury in fact”: (i) a particularization inquiry; (ii) a tangibility 
inquiry; and, if “intangible”: (iii) a constitutional inquiry; (iv) a historical 
inquiry; and, if Congress has acted: (v) an inquiry into consequent “real 
harm;” and (vi) the “material” risk thereof.26 
A. Particularized Injury
Modern standing doctrine exhibits an aversion to adjudicating claims of 
“generalized grievances.”27 Cases reiterate that Article III requires injuries 
that are “concrete and particularized.”28 A “personal stake” is said to be 
necessary to invoke judicial authority.29 The Ninth Circuit had read “concrete 
and particularized” as a unified term of art assessing the presence or absence 
of “generalized grievances.” It found “injury in fact” because Robins 
22 Id. at 410, 413-14. 
23 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1544, 1550. 
24 Id. at 1550. 
25 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
26   A flowchart of our understanding is attached infra at page 62.  
27 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992). 
28 Id. at 560. The phrase “concrete and particularized” first appeared in Lujan, and a Lexis search 
for “concrete w/3 particularized” in the Supreme Court database generates thirty-two post-Lujan hits. 
29 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
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complained of mistreatment of information about him—an “individual rather 
than collective” injury.30 
The Ninth Circuit might be forgiven—in light of prior usage—for 
treating the phrase as a unitary appellation.31 But Justice Alito’s majority 
rejected this understanding, chiding: “We have made it clear time and time 
again that an injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized.”32 Justice 
Alito’s majority acknowledged—as it had to in light of prior case law—that a 
“particularized” injury need not be unique to the plaintiff.33 And, although 
less than pellucid on this point, it did not dispute Justice Ginsburg’s 
statement, in her dissent, that “Robins, the Court holds, meets the 
particularity requirement for standing under Article III.”34 So for Robins, the 
question was whether his injury was “concrete.” 
B. Concrete Injury: “Tangible Injuries Are Perhaps Easier to Recognize”35
In explicating the requirement of “concreteness,” Justice Alito deployed a 
plethora of scare-quote-enveloped epithets: “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de 
facto’; that is, it must actually exist. . . . [It must be] ‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”36 
But, he explained, “‘[c]oncrete’ is not . . . necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’”37 
On this not insignificant point, the Court was unanimous—garnering agreement 
in Justice Thomas’s concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.38 
Still, “tangible injuries,” we are told, “are perhaps easier to recognize.”39 
It appears that a “tangible” injury is a sufficient but not a necessary condition 
30 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). 
31 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1555 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the 
four cases cited by the Court, and many others, opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the 
terms ‘concrete’ and ‘particularized.’”). 
32 Id. at 1548 (majority opinion). 
33 See id. at 1548 n.7 (“The fact that an injury may be suffered by a large number of people does 
not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance.”). In light of the public good 
characteristics of information, injuries involving information are particularly likely to be widely 
shared. See Kreimer, supra note 5, at 754-55, 766-86. 
34 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1554 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 1549 (majority opinion). 
36 Id. at 1548. 
37 Id. at 1549. 
38 See id. at 1550 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court explains that ‘concrete’ means ‘real,’ 
and ‘not abstract,’ but is not ‘necessarily synonymous with tangible.’ . . . I join the Court’s opinion.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 1555-56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Concreteness as a 
discrete requirement for standing, the Court’s decisions indicate, refers to the reality of an injury, 
harm that is real, not abstract, but not necessarily tangible.”). As detailed in Kreimer, supra note 5, 
the Court has regularly recognized intangible injuries in fact regarding information, 
notwithstanding periodic eruptions of language regarding “palpable” or “tangible” injury. The 
Court’s unanimous and explicit recognition of this practice is welcome clarification. 
39 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (majority opinion). 
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for showing the constitutionally requisite “concrete” injury in fact. But what 
is “tangibility”? 
One could perhaps equate “tangible injury” with financial or physical 
injury. As Thomas Jefferson declared: “The legitimate powers of government 
extend to such acts only as are injurious to others.—But it does me no injury 
for my neighbour [sic] to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither 
picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”40 The Court in Spokeo seemed to 
acknowledge the physical injury accompanying mass torts as a paradigm case 
of justiciable injury.41 And in other cases, the Court has uncontroversially 
regarded financial injuries as justiciable, even when no physical interference 
takes place.42 So tangible injuries apparently embrace what Justice Scalia 
referred to as “Wallet Injury”43 to the value of economic interests, including 
intellectual property rights, along with physical interference. 
C. Intangible Constitutional Injury
The Spokeo majority opens its explication of intangible injuries by 
observing that the Court has “confirmed in many . . . previous cases that 
intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (free speech); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (free exercise).”44 Characterizing these
cases as involving intangible injury is puzzling. Lukumi involved the threat of
a $500 fine or sixty days in jail for engaging in ritual animal sacrifice,45 and in
Summum, efforts by the plaintiffs to erect their “stone monument” would have
likely been met with force or legal sanctions.46
But the Court surely captures the gist of a solid line of existing case law 
in observing that it has regularly entertained claims of constitutional injury 
bare of physical or economic sequelae. In originally framing the “injury in 
fact” requirement, the Court observed, “[a] person or a family may have a 
40 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 166 (1832). 
41 See 136 S. Ct. at 1548 n.7 (“The victims’ injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely 
shared, to be sure, but each individual suffers a particularized harm.”). 
42 See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618-19 (1989) (concluding that standing 
existed where a company’s mineral leases were endangered by an adverse state court decision); Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 n.18 (1975) (indicating that a “plaintiff who challenges a zoning
ordinance or zoning practices” may establish standing by demonstrating “a present contractual
interest in a particular project” that would be impeded by the ordinance or practices); Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970) (concluding that plaintiffs had standing
where they alleged that competition caused them economic injury).
43 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
44 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
45 508 U.S. at 528. 
46 555 U.S. at 464-67. Admittedly stone is not concrete, but still, the dispute seems quite palpable. 
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spiritual stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise 
issues concerning the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,”47 
and it has regularly recognized purely spiritual stakes as injuries in fact for 
four decades.48 In addition, the Court in Spokeo cites Clapper v. Amnesty 
International for the proposition “that the risk of real harm can[] satisfy the 
requirement of concreteness.”49 In Clapper, the “real harm” at issue was the 
National Security Agency’s manifestly intangible acquisition of telephony 
metadata information in alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment.50 Both 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent acknowledged 
that acquisition of information as a potential “injury in fact.”51 So, too, Justice 
Thomas’s concurrence52 cites with approval Carey v. Piphus, a venerable 
decision that sanctioned the award of nominal and potentially punitive 
damages for a violation of procedural due process that had no tangible effect 
on the plaintiffs’ status.53 And in other cases during the October 2015 Term, 
the Court continued its unbroken practice of recognizing the intangible 
impacts of marginal dilution of voting strength54 and personalized differential 
treatment by race55 as “injuries in fact.” 
Not every constitutional provision will be held to import “injury in fact”.56 
But lower courts—like a full complement of Supreme Court Justices—will 
find in Spokeo no limit on their degrees of freedom in regard to the 
justiciability of constitutional rights. 
47 Camp, 397 U.S. at 154. 
48 See Kreimer, supra note 5, at 784-89 (examining cases in which the Court found standing 
because of intangible injuries to plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause interests). 
49 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013)). 
50 136 S. Ct. at 1143-44. 
51 Compare id. at 1147-50 (majority opinion) (concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing because 
their alleged harm was too conjectural, but never questioning whether the government’s acquisition 
of telephone metadata could suffice to establish injury in fact), with id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“No one here denies that the Government’s interception of a private telephone or e-mail 
conversation amounts to an injury that is ‘concrete and particularized.’”). 
52 Id. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
53 435 U.S. 247, 260-61, 266-67 (1978). 
54 See, e.g., Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016) (addressing voting malapportionment 
claims on the merits); Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016) 
(addressing the same); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962) (holding that plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge the voting apportionment at issue as unconstitutional). 
55 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (adjudicating on the merits claims 
of racial discrimination by a student who could not show that she would have been admitted to the 
University of Texas in the absence of an affirmative action program). The practice of recognizing 
personal differential treatment by race as a free standing “injury in fact” goes back four decades to 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
56 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171-80 (1974) (holding that a taxpayer 
lacked standing to challenge the Central Intelligence Agency Act as violative of Article 1, Section 9, 
Clause 7, because he was asserting a generalized grievance and could not show individual injury). 
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D. Intangible Harms: History
Having touched on constitutional injuries, which were not at issue in 
Spokeo, the Court pays the homage to history that has become customary in 
opinions on standing: 
In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, 
both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles. Because the 
doctrine of standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and 
because that requirement in turn is grounded in historical practice, it is 
instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close 
relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a 
basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.57 
Vermont Agency, the case cited in Spokeo for historical support, held that the 
existence of qui tam suits during the framing era provided safe harbor for the 
standing of modern qui tam plaintiffs pursuing bounty actions, in which they 
could claim no personal harm.58 And just one month after deciding Spokeo, 
the Court exhibited no jurisdictional qualms about addressing the merits of a 
claim by a private qui tam relator.59 
There is a certain artificiality to this focus on history. It has long been 
recognized that the Courts of Westminster entertained requests for advisory 
opinions alien to the role of the federal courts in the tripartite American 
constitutional structure.60 The relevance of “historical practice” to plaintiff 
standing also is attenuated by the merger of law and equity under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which have superseded the traditional forms of action 
and rules of equity.61 And the doctrine of standing as we know it—including 
the “injury in fact” requirement—was forged in large part through 
adjudications involving the administrative state during the twentieth 
century.62 It thus seems anachronistic and perhaps quixotic to fixate on the 
57 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 
U.S. 765, 775-77 (2000)). Justice Thomas continued even further down the path, exploring common 
law doctrines from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in detail. See id. at 1550-52. 
58 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 529 U.S. at 776-77. 
59 Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
60 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (noting that “the power of English judges to 
deliver advisory opinions was well established at the time the Constitution was drafted”). 
61 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 818-
36, 855-58 (2004) (describing supersession of common law forms of action and equity rules by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the challenges this change poses for a historical account of 
Article III standing requirements). 
62 See, e.g., Daniel E. Ho & Erica Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An 
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010) (noting that 
“conventional accounts” of the origins of the standing doctrine focus on the emergence of the 
administrative state, and exploring the doctrine’s evolution over the twentieth century). 
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question of how James Madison and Chief Justice Marshall would view the 
requirement of “concrete injury” in a class action seeking damages for the 
improper information processing techniques of a website aggregating data 
from across the Internet. 
Nonetheless, having put history and tradition on the table, one might have 
expected Justice Alito to address the rather robust Anglo-American history 
of statutes allowing private parties to collect bounties for enforcing public 
duties. Early in this nation’s history, Chief Justice Marshall noted that—as 
one might expect in a new nation lacking an administrative apparatus—
“[a]lmost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be recovered by 
an action of debt as well as by information.”63 And a century later, citing a 
plethora of precedent, Justice Peckham observed: 
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who himself had no interest 
whatever in the controversy other than that given by statute, have been in existence 
for hundreds of years in England, and in this country ever since the foundation 
of our Government. The right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by 
statute is frequently given to the first common informer who brings the action, 
although he has no interest in the matter whatever except as such informer.64 
But Justice Alito’s majority opinion declined to engage with these or other 
historical statutory analogies to the FCRA. 
Alternatively, Justice Thomas suggested that, under the common law, “the 
concrete-harm requirement does not apply as rigorously” in certain 
circumstances that could cover Robins’s suit.65 Justice Alito’s majority, 
however, did not consider common law analogs, unlike analysis in other recent 
statutory-damage cases.66 Courts and litigants thus have the option of seeking 
a safe harbor for standing for statutory damages via “instructive” history. But 
they have little guidance on how to find it. 
E. Concrete Intangible Injuries: The “Judgment of Congress” and “Real Harm”
Whatever the parameters of freestanding constitutional or historical 
injury, Robins came before the Court asserting a claim for which Congress 
had provided a right to litigate. In Flast v. Cohen, Justice Harlan—hardly a 
judicial activist by the standards of his day—had taken the position that 
63 Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 341 (1805). 
64 Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905). 
65 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1552 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the requirement is not 
rigorous “when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his own private rights”). 
66 See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 275-85 (2008) (relying 
on English and early American case law in concluding that an assignee, who would not receive any 
benefit from pursuing a claim, still has standing); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625-26 (2004) (reading 
a statutory damages scheme against a backdrop of common law tort doctrine). 
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Congress had broad authority to designate private attorneys “to represent the 
public interest, despite their lack of economic or other personal interests.”67 
And Justice Kennedy’s pivotal concurrence in Lujan, as the Court noted in 
Spokeo, prominently affirmed that “Congress has the power to define injuries 
and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before.”68 
The Spokeo opinion reaffirms that Congress has a role in “identifying and 
elevating intangible harms.”69 Thus, Justice Alito cites with approval to 
Summers v. Earth Island Institute,70 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,71 and Friends 
of the Earth v. Laidlaw,72 all of which recognized the intangible “aesthetic” 
injury suffered by plaintiffs encountering the results of environmental 
degradation as sufficiently “real” or “concrete” for justiciability when 
Congress so directs.73 This is settled law in environmental cases as old as the 
“injury-in-fact” locution itself74 and the Court apparently continues to 
recognize it. Still, for the Spokeo majority, in the face of congressional 
determination, the Court retains the authority to veto harms that are 
insufficiently “concrete” or “real” in its view. The opinion states, for example, 
that “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” is not 
itself a sufficient injury.75 
But all is not lost. Justice Alito’s opinion goes on to acknowledge, with a 
double negative, that the disparagement of bare procedural violations “does 
not mean . . . that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of 
concreteness.”76 Apparently, where Congress identifies a threshold injury 
that, by itself, is not sufficiently concrete for Article III purposes, standing 
can be salvaged if there is an adequate risk of a consequent “real harm.” 
1. Threshold and Consequent Injuries
The analysis suggested by Justice Alito’s majority distinguishes between 
threshold injuries, such as “bare procedural violations,” and the sturdier “real” 
injuries to which they lead—and upon which they will piggyback over the 
67 392 U.S. 83, 131 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
68 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
69 Id. 
70 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
71 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
72 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
73 Summers, 555 U.S. at 494; Laidlaw 528 U.S. at 183; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63. 
74 See Kreimer, supra note 5, at 780-84 (discussing the history of “aesthetic” injuries in the 
environmental context). 
75 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
76 Id. 
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Article III finish line.77 This explanation opens with an analogy: “For 
example, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if 
their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”78 We might deduce from 
this that slander, like bare procedural violations, is a threshold, non-concrete 
or unreal harm. But because slander can cause consequent real harms, it 
satisfies Article III. 
Plaintiffs apparently need not always make a dual threshold/consequent 
injury showing. Plaintiffs in some cases “need not allege any additional harm 
beyond the one Congress has identified.”79 The Court cites to two such cases. 
In Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the Court “confirm[ed] that a group 
of voters’ ‘inability to obtain information’ that Congress had decided to make 
public is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III.”80 And Public Citizen 
v. Department of Justice, held “that two advocacy organizations’ failure to
obtain information subject to disclosure under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act ‘constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing
to sue.’”81 Similarly, four months before Spokeo, the Court held justiciable a
class action based on a named plaintiff ’s claim for $1500 in statutory damages
for receipt of an unsolicited automatic text message in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.82
The procedural/threshold versus consequent/real injury two-step inquiry 
introduces considerable play in the joints of analysis. By citing Akins and 
Public Citizen, the Court appears to recognize that the inability to obtain 
information is a sufficiently concrete harm. This position seems in accord 
with settled practice that treats informational harms as a “real” injury entailed 
by the violation itself.83 
However, the majority, unlike Justice Thomas in concurrence and Justice 
Ginsburg in dissent, does not cite the foundational case of Havens Realty Corp. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 569 (libel), 570 (slander per se) (AM. 
LAW. INST. 1938)). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. (citing 524 U.S. 11, 20-25 (1998)). 
81 Id. at 1549-50 (citing 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). 
82 Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669-72 (2016). Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito filed dissents challenging the plaintiff ’s standing, based on the named plaintiff having 
been offered the $1500 in statutory damages, but neither batted an eyelash at the absence of 
allegations of “concrete” or “tangible harm” beyond receipt of the prohibited text message. See id. at 
677-83 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 683-85 (Alito, J., dissenting).
83 See Kreimer, supra note 5, at 765-72 (reviewing the case law and concluding that “before and
after Lujan, the Court found that denial of access to information imposes a justiciable ‘injury in fact,’ 
even in the absence of other tangible impact on plaintiffs”); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 654 (suggesting 
that, after Akins, “[i]f Congress granted standing to citizens in general to seek information and 
information has been withheld, citizens in general can bring suit”). 
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v. Coleman.84 In Havens, the defendant, in alleged violation of the Fair
Housing Act, falsely informed a black tester, but not a white tester, that no
apartments at a property were available.85 The Court unanimously held that
the black tester, who had no intention of renting an apartment, had suffered
an injury in fact.86 The Fair Housing Act, it observed, prohibited informing
“any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin that any
dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is
in fact so available.”87 The fact that “the tester may have approached the real
estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and
without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact
of injury . . . . [to the] statutorily created right to truthful housing information.”88 
But if inaccurate information per se constitutes a concrete harm in 
Havens, why not in Spokeo? And if Robins has to prove some “harm” beyond 
inaccuracy, is the standing of testers in fair housing cases now in doubt? 
Perhaps the answer is that a practice of racial steering endangers values of the 
Fair Housing Act. But if so, is it not also plausible to observe, as Justice 
Ginsburg does in her dissent, that the practice of disseminating inaccurate 
information endangers the values of the FCRA?89 
Readers, litigants, and lower courts are left to ponder whether Justice 
Alito’s majority here is leaving open the possibility that, in future cases, the Court 
will treat some informational harm as a mere threshold injury—insufficient to 
establish Article III standing unless such informational harm is linked to a 
more concrete sequelae. This would be a remarkably libertarian and 
disruptive result, given the pervasiveness of informational regulation.90 On 
its face, however, Spokeo is an acknowledgment that, in the information age, 
statutory duties regarding information disclosure can generally be enforced 
by their intended beneficiaries. 
84 455 U.S. 363 (1982); see also Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1553 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Havens 
for the proposition that a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a statutory right “need not allege actual harm 
beyond the invasion of that private right”); id. at 1555 & n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting 
Congress’s ability to confer enforceable rights to information). 
85 Havens, 455 U.S. at 368. 
86 Id. at 373-74. 
87 Id. at 373 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)). 
88 Id. at 374. 
89 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1555 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Just as the right to truthful 
information at stake in Havens . . . was closely tied to the Fair Housing Act’s goal of eradicating 
racial discrimination in housing, so the right here at stake is closely tied to the FCRA’s goal of 
protecting consumers against dissemination of inaccurate credit information about them.”). 
90 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 618-24 (providing examples of a number of statutory 
frameworks that require various kinds of information disclosures). 
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2. “Material” Risk of “Real Harm”
It is not enough for a plaintiff to identify a threshold and consequent 
injury. The two must be adequately linked. With each iteration, however, the 
nature of the link required by Justice Alito’s majority seems to change. The 
majority opinion in Spokeo begins the relevant section by informing readers 
that there must be a “risk of real harm.”91 In the slander analogy, however, any 
discussion of “risk” as probability of occurrence falls away. Rather, injury in 
fact exists “if [plaintiffs’ consequent] harms may be difficult to prove or 
measure.”92 Finally, when remanding to the Ninth Circuit, the Court 
instructs that inaccurate reporting must “present [a] material risk of harm.”93 
We are here offered three different kinds of links that are not quite 
congruent. First, we have abstract injuries that create material “degrees of risk” 
of consequent concrete harms. Next, we have consequent concrete harms that 
are difficult to measure. Third, we have consequent concrete harms that are 
difficult to prove. Since these are independent considerations, the factors may 
combine in various ways. Plaintiffs may show a risk of non-provable or non-
measurable harm, or a non-provable or non-measurable risk of harm. They 
may show a non-provable risk of non-measurable harm, or a non-measurable risk 
of non-provable harm. And “materiality” may refer to the degree of risk—
judged by its probability—or to its gravity—according to statutory or other 
values. The potential word games evoke Justice Harlan’s admonition.94 
There is also the issue of quantification: what degree of risk is “material?” 
How difficult must it be to prove or measure injuries in order to relax the 
injury in fact requirements? The opinion alludes to Clapper for the 
proposition that “[t]his does not mean . . . that the risk of real harm cannot 
satisfy the requirement of concreteness.”95 Clapper dismissed the risk of 
interception of communications in the national security context as an 
insufficient basis for constitutional standing because the risk of interception 
fell short of “clearly impending” harm.96 Is this a triple negative suggesting 
that harm must be “clearly impending?” We think not. Clapper acknowledged 
in a footnote that “[i]n some instances, we have found standing based on a 
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”97 The Spokeo opinion also cites 
approvingly Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,98 which glossed Clapper and 
found the requisite “substantial risk” of harm where plaintiffs alleged a 
91 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 Id. at 1550. 
94  See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
95 Id. at 1549 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)). 
96 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147-50. 
97 Id. at 1150 n.5. 
98 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (citing 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014)). 
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“credible threat” of future prosecution under an unconstitutional statute.99 
But like future courts and litigators, we cannot be sure. 
Ultimately, identifying this degree of risk is a deeply mysterious business. 
The Alito majority states that “[i]t is difficult to imagine how dissemination 
of an incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete harm,”100 and 
Justice Ginsburg refrains from contradicting this statement.101 But if the test 
is imagination, advocates with more fertile vision will fill the gap rapidly.102 
We imagine that the test is not imagination. But if it is not, how is the “degree 
of risk” to be judged? And is it to be judged in terms of the “risk” that 
Congress discerned in a particular class of cases, or the “risk” that the plaintiff 
suffers in the case at hand? 
III. CONCLUSION: THE SPOKEO (NON)-SOLUTION
Set against these “general principles,” the Court in Spokeo remanded the 
case to the Ninth Circuit with a final set of directives. “In the context of this 
particular case,” the Ninth Circuit is instructed, the “general principles” we 
have discussed so far, 
[T]ell us two things: On the one hand, Congress plainly sought to curb the
dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to
decrease that risk. On the other hand, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of
Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation. A violation [that] . . . may
result in no harm.103
This latter “no harm” scenario, in turn, can occur in one of two ways: (a) 
Information may be “entirely accurate” “even if a consumer reporting agency 
fails to provide the required notice to a user of the agency’s consumer 
99 Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2343-46. 
100 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
101 See id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Robins would not qualify, the Court observes, if 
he alleged a ‘bare’ procedural violation, one that results in no harm, for example, ‘an incorrect zip 
code.’ Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins complains of misinformation about his education, 
family situation, and economic status . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
102 To us, it does not take much to imagine that an incorrect zip code could delay or prevent 
delivery of packages, letters, or checks. We are of course law professors, but actual examples are not 
lacking. See, e.g., Sarah Fenske, Any Error in Your Mailing Address Could Send Your Package to Post 
Office Hell, L.A. WEEKLY (Dec. 13, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/any-error-in-your-
mailing-address-could-send-your-package-to-post-office-hell-4255056 [https://perma.cc/48NF-P83H] 
(“If you put the wrong ZIP code on a package, that simple mistake could land you in post office 
hell.”). Indeed, the Post Office has an official designation for “mail having an incorrect barcode 
and/or ZIP Code discovered at a destination for which it is not addressed”: “loop mail.” U.S. POSTAL 
SERV., HANDBOOK PO-441, REHANDLING OF MAIL BEST PRACTICES 18 (2002). 
103 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. By “two things,” the Court apparently means the propositions in 
text. We count at least four things. Cf. DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT (1957) (discussing 
characters “thing one” and “thing two,” which evolve to things three and four). 
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information,” rendering the failure a non-justiciable “bare procedural 
violation;”104 Or, (b), the inaccuracy can fail to “cause harm or present any 
material risk of harm”; for instance, “an incorrect zip code” does not present 
a “material risk of harm.”105 However, the opinion “express[es] no view about 
any other types of false information.”106 
What might this mean? Here is our best reconstruction: First, a plaintiff 
must assert congressional “identification” of procedural, informational, or 
other intangible harm. For Robins, these threshold harms involve violations 
of a statute that “sought to curb the dissemination of false information.”107 If 
he cannot show that false information has been disseminated about him, he 
apparently cannot claim any congressionally recognized injury.108 
Second, the plaintiff must identify, or the Court must discern, some “real” 
consequent harm of which there is some material (or non-provable or 
non-measurable) risk. The Court instructs the Ninth Circuit on remand to 
address “whether the particular procedural violations alleged . . . entail a 
degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”109 As we have 
noted, the process and standards for defining and proving the requisite 
“degree” of risk are puzzling. 
The outcome of Spokeo, like its six steps (represented in the attached 
flowchart), is indeterminate. It answers some questions, but Spokeo’s analysis 
ultimately resembles its outcome—an unstable equilibrium—leaving courts, 
litigants, and commentators in considerable doubt as to where the wheel will 
spin next when the Court reaches full strength. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1550 n.8. 
107 Id. at 1550. 
108 This proposition is not self-evident. The FCRA was designed to allow the subjects of 
information to dispute or put the information in context if employers took adverse action based on 
the information. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC 
Charges Company Allegedly Marketed Information to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of 
FCRA (June 12, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/06/spokeo-pay-800000-
settle-ftc-charges-company-allegedly-marketed [https://perma.cc/7WCG-TBJH] (noting that the 
FTC had reached a settlement with Spokeo for, inter alia, failing to notify consumers if a consumer 
report user took an adverse action against the consumer based on information contained in the 
consumer report in violation of its obligations as a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA). 
Since there is—as far as we can tell—no analysis by the Court of the text, purpose, context, structure, 
or history of the FCRA to divine what Congress “sought” to do, this exploration is as yet without 
guidance for other statutes. Indeed, whether the Ninth Circuit on remand—or other courts—are 
permitted to discern other statutory purposes for the FCRA is unclear. 
109 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
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